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BRINGING THE ECONOMY BACK IN (AGAIN):
CONCEPTIONS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE AND THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Patrick J. Akard
University of Kansas
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1986, Vol. XI, No. 2:75-1'00
The economic role of the state has been the central issue in
recent debates on public policy. This is particularly manifest in
the numerous works on "reindustrialization" that have .inundated
the media, business press, public policy discussions, and best-seller
lists. These seek to explain the recent stagnation of the U.S.
economy, and offer corr.esponding policy recommendations for
"economic revitalization." Whether conservative "free market"
proponents, "corporatist" advocates of a national "industrial policy,"
or social-democratic critics of capitalism, all focus on the
problematic relationship between the state and the economy in the
contemporary U.S.--though they disagree on what that relationship
is.! . .
At the same time, there has been a great deal of work on the
state in recent political and sociological theory. Previous
conceptions of the nature of the state in a capitalist system have
been challenged, and new ones formulated. Much of the
contemporary debate on the theory of the capitalist state is directly
relevant to the recent political and economic upheavals in the U.S.
As usual, however, the separation .of "theorists" and "policy
analysts" in social science has' precluded much contact between
these two bodies of literature.
This paper considers one of the central issues in
contemporary political sociology--the question of the "autonomy" of
the state--in the context of recent political and economic events in
the U.S. A number of political theorists have challenged the
dominance of what they see as an overly-deterministic conception
of the state. They advocate "bringing the state back in" by
emphasizing the independent influence of state structures, state
manager, political parties, and "political" factors over other social
and (especially) economic phenomena. Some of this work stressing
the "primacy of the political" addresses the deficiencies of previous
mainstream orientations in political science and political
sociology--for example, pluralist conceptions, or structural-
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functionalism (Cf. Skocpol, 1985:4-5). But most of it is directed
toward the recent body of work on the state within the Marxist
tradition--with varying degrees of sympathy.
Perhaps the most prominent of these critics in mainstream
American sociology are Theda Skocpol and an associated group
who employ a "historical-comparative" method to counter the
perceived over-emphasis on the economic determinants of the
political by neo-Marxists.f However,' there has been an extensive
debate within the neo-Marxist literature on the "relative autonomy"
of the state as well. While statements supporting a degree of state
autonomy can be traced back to Marx and Engels,3 the' issue has
become especially importan t since the late 19605. Two of the most
prominent theorists in this regard have been Nicos Poulantzas in
France (building on the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser)
and Claus Offe in Germany (influenced by Weber and the critical
theory tradition as well as by Marx). In the U.S., the recent work
of Fred Block (1979, 1980) has extended the concept of state
autonomy while attempting to remain within (broadly construed)
Marxist parameters.
This essay will focus on the work of Skocpol and Block.f For
both, the issue of state autonomy is central. Each is writing in the
American context, and are critical of what they see as the overly-
abstract nature of much neo-Marxist work. Both seek to bring the
debate on the state to a more concrete and historical level. This
invites an assessment of the relevance of their work for
interpreting current policy-oriented debates on the state and the
economy in the U.S. It will be argued here that, while they provide
some welcome corrections to the deficiencies of certain neo-Marxist
conceptions, their -own work suffers from an over-emphasis on the
independence of the political sphere from economic and societal
>.' co nst r aints.':" This' 'seriously undermines' 'their usefulness for
explaining the vagaries of recent U.S. economic policy, or for
bringing to light the limits of most of the current prescriptions for
"rcindustrializa tion."
CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AUTONOMY:
SKOCPOL AND BLOCK
Some Neo-Marxist 'Ideal Types'
Most critiques of Marxist theories of the state attack one or
both of two well-known "types." One is the so-called
"instrumentalist" perspective, which stresses the more or less
c~nscious control of state policies and state apparatuses (either
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ruling class, or at least a faction of the most powerful capitalists.
This view is usually attributed to Miliband (1969), Domhoff (1967),
and theorists of "corporate liberalism" like Kolko (1963) or
Weinstein (1968). The other type is the "structuralist" orientation
most often linked to the earlywritings of Poulantzas (1974). Here
the state is seen as the more or less automatic force of "social
cohesion" which mediates the intra- and inter-class conflicts
inherent in a capitalist mode of production. While not directly
controlled by capitalists, the capitalist state nevertheless
"functions" to reproduce .the conditions of capitalist production.
In addi tion, a third ideal-typical perspecti ve is often
distinguished in the Marxian tradition, usually referred to as the
"class struggle" approach. Within the contemporary neo-Marxist
debates, this approach emerged as a critique of both instrumentalist
and structuralist views--notably, in the later work of Poulantzas
himself (Poulantzas, 1980; see also Esping-Anderson et aI., 1976).
From this perspective the capitalist state is shaped by the political
manifestations of the economic struggle between classes or class
fractions; the structure and activities of the state are thus
determined by the outcomes of these struggles.f
Each of these three "types" evokes a particular problematic,
and a specific type of critical inquiry. If one's target is an
"instrumentalist" theory, then the fundamental questions are: is
there direct (or at least strong indirect) control of state apparatuses
and state policies by a capitalist ruling class? And what are the
mechanisms through which the capitalist class uses the state to
promote its own interests? With structuralist arguments, one must
ask: what are the structural constraints upon the state under
capitalism? Or, what are the imperatives or "functions" of a
specifically capitalist state which must be accomplished if the
reproduction of capitalism 'is to occu-r? For the class-conflict
approach: how is the conflict between economic classes in
capitalist society reproduced in the political sphere, in the control
over state apparatuses and state policies? And how do the
outcomes of such struggles affect changes in the structure and
actions of the sta te?
Block's Ambiguous State Autonomy
In his well-known essay, appropriately titled "The Ruling
Class Does not Rule" (1979), Fred Block criticizes one type of
Marxist determinism while retaining an overall approach to the
capitalist state that is squarely within the tradition. On the one
hand, he rejects the instrumentalist idea of a class-conscious
capitalist class controlling the state. For Block, the necessity of
77
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interest in individual profit maximization and the competition
between capitals precludes the formation of a coherent
consciousness of the long-term interests of "capital" as a whole.
Instead, he argues that there is "a division of labor between those
who accumulate capital and those who manage the state apparatus"
(1979:130). This group of autonomous "state managers" is not
identifiable with either the capitalist class or the working class.
Even Poulantzas' conception of "relative autonomy," he argues, does
not go far enough "in recognizing the specificity of the political"
(1980: 228).
On the other hand, Block retains the Marxist concern with the
structural mechanisms "that make a state a capitalist state"
(1979:128)--i.e. those mechanisms that constrain and limit the options
of state activity in a capitalist economy. This means that "the
central theoretical task is to explain how it .is that despite this
division of labor [between capitalists and state managers], the state
tends to serve the interests of the capitalist class" (1979:130). This
attempt to explain both independent state managers and the
structural constraints upon state activity under capitalism leads to
some crucial ambiguities, as will be shown.
There are two "major structural mechanisms" that constrain
the state and the actions of state managers under capitalism,
according to Block. The first is the dependency of state managers
on successful capital accumulation. Block outlines this relationship
as follows:
First, the capacity of the state to finance itself through
taxation or borrowing depends on the state of the
economy, ~ '! .•.. Second, public support f'or a regime will
decline sharply if the regime presides over a serious drop
in the level of economic activity, with- a parallel rise in
unemployment and shortages of key goods.
In a capitalist economy the level of economic activity is
largely determined by the private investment decisions of
capitalists. This means that capitalists, in their collective
role as investors, have a veto over state policies. . .. This
discourages state managers from taking actions that
might seriously decrease the rate of investment. It also
means that state managers have a direct interest in using
their power to facilitate investment. . .. In doing so, the
state managers address the problem of investment from a
broader perspective than that of the individual
capitalists. This increases the likelihood that such
78
..~.
Bringing the Economy Back In
policies will be in the general interest of capital
(1979:133).
The other key structural mechanism exerting force on state policy
is that of class struggle:
In its struggles to protect itself from the ravages of a
market economy, the working class has played a key role
in the steady expansion of the state's role in capitalist
societies. . .. The working class has not been the only
force behind the expansion of the state's role in these
areas. Examples can be cited of capitalists who have
supported an expansion of the state's role into a certain
area either because of narrow self-interest. .. or because
of some farsighted recognition of the need to co-opt the
working class. However, the major impetus for the
extension of the state's role has come from the working
class and from the managers of the state apparatus,
whose own powers expand with a growing state
(1979:137).
The state, then, is determined by the interaction and relative power
of these three sets of interests--those of capital, the working class,
and the state managers themselves. For example,
Where there is strong popular pressure for an expansion
of social services or increased regulation of markets, the
state managers must weigh three factors. First, they do
not want to damage business confidence. .... Second, they
do not want class antagonisms to escalate to a level that
would endanger their own rule. Third, they recognize
that their own power and resources will grow if the
state's role is expanded (1979:138).
According to Block, capitalists, lacking a coherent class
consciousness, are basically short-sighted and self-interested, and
thus generally oppose the expansion of the state into the private
sector. But if their control of capital is so pervasive, how do we
explain the magnitude of the state's intrusion into the economy?
And how would state managers obtain the independence necessary
to enact policies for long-term sta bility and the welfare of all?
Block's answer is that there are certain periods "in which the
decline of business confidence as a veto on 'government policies
doesn't work" (1979:139). These are periods of war, major
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depressions, or postwar reconstruction, "in which dramatic
increases in the state's role have occurred" (1979:139). Thus a
certain degree of independence is guaranteed by the vagaries of the
market itself, or by historical contingencies such as war, as well as
by the position of managers relative to other classes.
The attempt to link structural constraints with autonomous
state managers ultimately results in ambiguity regarding the degree
of independence of the political sphere. For example, in a paper
" that attempts to go beyond Poulantzas' concept of "relative
autonomy," Block states that "the starting point of an alternative
formulation is the acknowledgment that state power is sui generis,
not reducible to class power" (Block, 1980:229). But in the same
paragraph he qualifies this seemingly strong statement of state
autonomy: "But the exercise of state power occurs within
particular class contexts, which shape and limit the exercise of that
power. These class contexts in turn are the products of particular
relations of production" (1980:229). On the next page, Block
discusses the possibility that "state managers, to improve their own
position, will seek to expropriate, or at the least, place severe
restrictions on the property of dominant classes" (1980:230). But a
few sentences later he appears to revoke this degree of possible
independence for state managers under capitalism:
In social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of
production, the dominant historical pattern has been the
development of a modus vivendi that is highly fa vorable
to the owners of capital. Not only have state managers
been generally restrained from attacking the property
rights of capitalists, but the exercise of state power has
largely been usedjn ways that strengthen the capitalist
accumulation .process.This modus vivendi is rooted in the
class context created by capitalism (1980:230).
Ultimately, Block's critique of overly-deterministic theories
of the capitalist state applies, at most, only to a relatively
simplistic instrumentalist argument that identifies capitalists and
the managers of state apparatus.
Skocpol's Independently Determinate State
Skocpol's argument for the autonomy of the political sphere
goes far beyond Block's focus on the class character of state actors,
and deals with the organizational effects of state structures on
economy and society. Her basic charge is that "neo-Marxists of all
varieties have so far given insufficient weight to state and party
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organizations as independent determinants of po Ii tical conflicts
and outcomes" (1980:156). In a historical study of New Deal
legislation, Skocpol (1980) critically examines each of the three
nco-Marxist theories of the state outlined above, and finds them
wanting.
Skocpol first assesses the adequacy of instrumentalist
assumptions, selecting as her example the theory of "corporate
liberalism" as it appears in the work of Weinstein (1968), Domhoff
(1970), and Radosh (1972). "For theorists of corporate liberalism,"
she argues, "the New Deal is envisaged as a set of clever capitalist
strategies to stabilize and revitalize a' U.S. economy dominated by
large corporations" (1980:161-2). Tracing the history of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Labor Relations
Act, she sets out to disprove this assumption. While certain facts
seem to fit the corporate liberal picture, these theorists avoid
asking the "key questions:"
Was there at work during the 1930s a self conscious,
disciplined capitalist class, or vanguard of major
capitalists, that put forward functional strategies for
recovery and stabilization and had the political power to
implement them successfully? Wer:e most corporate
leaders (especially big, strategic businesses) prepared to
make concessions to labor? Did business opposition to the
New Deal come primarily from small business (1980:163)?
Skocpol's answer to all of these questions is no. In her view,
capitalists were insufficiently class conscious to recognize their
own long-term interest in reform and government intervention into
the economy, and this partially explains the failure of the NIRA to
promote, economic recovery (1980:l64). Business worked with a
"trade association consciousness" that limited the type of economic
coordination that· was acceptable to them. They stubbornly
opposed almost all concessions to labor; a fact which Skocpol
argues led eventually to the much more far-reaching reforms of the
Wagner Act (1980:166-7). And by late 1934, "big business" joined
the bandwagon in opposition to all New Deal reforms, along with
small businessmen, farmers, labor, and so on (1980:167-8), thereby
resisting policies by state managers that might have promoted
economic recovery. It is significant that Skocpol's main argument
against instrumentalist assumptions is not about the participation
of capitalists in government policy-making; indeed" she documents
this participation. It is, rather, their failure to transcend narrow
self-interest in the exercise of state power, which (for Skocpol)
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demonstrates their lack of class consciousness and led to their
failure in solving the crisis of capitalism of the 1930s.
The foil in Skocpol's critique of the structuralist perspective
is (as it is with almost all such critics) the early Poulantzas, whose
approach she terms "political functionalism." Once again she
stresses the failure of the NIRA as evidence of the failure of
theory, since
Poulantzian theory predicts functional outcomes of state
policies and interventions. It offers little direct
theoretical guidance for explaining why and how failures
of state policies could occur, especially not failures
threatening to capitalism (1980: 172).
Somewhat ironically, given her critique of instrumentalism,
Skocpol attacks Poulantzas' concept of "relative autonomy" by
demonstrating the lack of autonomous state managers in relation to
business interests. This lack of independence allowed powerful
corporations and trade associations to dominate policy, which had
negative long-term consequences, as noted above.
Arguably, a more autonomous form of state regulation
could have kept prices down and facilitated expanded
production. In any event, when businessmen themselves
became the state, government intervention could do little
more than reinforce and freeze the economic status quo
(1980:173-4).
To many readers, this may' appear as a remar-kably "instrumentalist"
statement. But, in keeping with her emphasis on the primacy of the
political, Skocpol stresses particular organizational factors of the
state as responsible for the influence of capitalists in government,
rather than the reverse. The lack of a developed, centralized
administrative capacity, the particular relationship between the
three branches of government in the U.S., etc., are factors cited in
the failure of· the NIRA and other attempts at economic
rationalization. These factors are always historically contingent:
Government capacities vary with the political histories of
various countries; in turn, the capacities affect what can
be done for capitalist economies and for capitalists both
in "normal" times and in crisis situations. Functional,
adaptive state interventions do not always occur, and a
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large part of the explanation for whether they do or do
not, and for the exact forms of state intervention, lies in
the prior histories of the state structures themselves
(1980:178).
Such observations do not bode well for structuralist, or any other
"grand theory" of the capitalist state, let alone a theory of the State
in general (see Skocpol, 1985:28).
Skocpol is much more fa vorably disposed to the "class
struggle" perspective, which is more congruent with an emphasis on
the determinate role of state structures and party organizations.
Her major example of this approach is Block's essay "The Ruling
Class Does Not Rule," examined above. However, always wary of
reducing the state to any "societal" level phenomena, she refuses to
accept "class struggle" as the determinant motive force of state
activity. But here Skocpol seems to reverse her earlier position on
the state structures of the U.S. in the 1930s, for in regard to
working class struggles she stresses the importance of autonomous
state managers. She notes the "decisive" initiatives "by liberal
politicians within the Democratic party" in promoting the
progressive labor legislation of the New Deal (chief among these
actors was Robert Wagner). While labor discontent may have
provided an important catalyst,
The U.S. industrial working class of the 1930s was not
strong enough either to force concessions through
economic disruption alone or impose a comprehensive
recovery program through the national political process.
It depended greatly on friendly initiatives and support
from -within the federal government and the Democratic
. -party. (l980: 189).
On the other hand, Skocpol also argues that existing "government
and party structures" in the U.S. probably prevented more radical,
social democratic reforms during the Second New Deal period of
1935-38, when the possibility for such reforms existed (1980:191-5).
Skocpol's basic conclusion is that "existing political
constraints--specifically, the U.S. government and political parties
of the 1930s" (1980: 197) prevented both the successful
rationalization of capitalism during its most serious period of
crisis, and more progressive social and economic reforms. Each of
the neo-Marxist positions examined fail to grasp this adequately,
since "no self declared neo-Marxist theory of the capitalist state has
arrived" at the point of taking state structures and party
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organizations seriously enough" (1980:200). In fact, she concludes
that there really can be no one theory of the capitalist state, since
capitalism in general has no politics, only (extremely
flexible) outer. limits for the kinds of supports for
property ownership and controls of the labor force that it
can tolera teo Sta tes and poli tical parties wi thin
capitalism have cross-nationally and historically varying
structures. These structures powerfully shape and limit
state interventions in the economy, and they determine
the ways in which class interests and conflicts get
organized into (or out of) politics in a given time and
place. More than this, state structures and party
organizations have (to a very significant degree)
independent histories. . .. In short, states and parties
have their own structures and histories, which in turn
have their own impact upon society (1980:200).
THE AUTONOMY OF THE CAPITALIST STATE:
AN ASSESSMENT
The critiques of neo-Marxist theories of the state by Block
and Skocpol both focus on the three types outlined above, and their
corresponding problematics. Their arguments will be assessed here
by first considering their critique of the "instrumentalist" brand of
reductionism, and then their positions on the structural
determinants of the state. Their views on the "class struggle"
problematic will be incorporated in the discussion of structural
constraints, since the issue is the determination of state structures
and actions by "societal" factors (in this case, the conf'Iict between
classes and class fractions).
State Autonomy and the Instrumentalist Problematic
The fundamental question in the instrumentalist debate
concerns the direct (or at least strong indirect) influence or control
of state apparatuses and policies by the capitalist class. It is, then,
about state actors: the relative power of participants in state
structures and their class background. Both Block and Skocpol
focus on the class consciousness of capitalists, and the (actual or
potential) conflicts between capitalists and sta te managers.
Both Block and Skocpol attack astraw man in their critiques
of instrumentalism. No "instrumentalist" of any note holds the
simplistic views upon which they focus their rebuttals. For
example, both Miliband and Domhoff recognize that key state
positions are' not always held directly by capitalists. They also
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acknowledge the conflicts between capitalists that manifest
themselves in disputes over policy (see, for example, Carnoy,
1984:211-14 on Domhoff's position). The crux of their work is to
demonstrate, nevertheless, the relative power of the capitalist class
over state policy.
For both Block and Skocpol, the central element of their
critique is the inability of capitalists to maintain a coherent
consciousness of their long-term interests as a class (vs. their
individual interests). For Block it is inherently problematic due-to
the conflicts between individual capitalist, interests. Skocpol
attempts to document this inability historically in her examination
of the New Deal. But how "coherent" and "far-sighted" must
capitalists be to verify the most important claims of the
instrumentalists? Is the issue the reia ti ve power of capi talists over
the mechanisms of the capitalist state, or their success in promoting
stable accumulation with a minimum of social disorder? For
Skocpol, at least, it is clearly the latter that is essential. But is this
the crucial issue? Further, her standard of "far-sightedness" is such
that the failure of business leaders to support labor reforms, or
economic planning that threatened their profits, indicates a lack of
class consciousness.
Unlike many of the structuralist claims, the instrumentalist
problematic lends itself to empirical examination. Interestingly,
Block posits the existence of "autonomous state managers" with no
empirical support. Skocpol, at least in her critique of
instrumentalism, offers historical evidence of the dominant
influence of business. Her rejection of instrumentalism, again, is
based on its lack of success in revitalizing the economy (of course
she stresses the particular state structures of the U.S. for making
possible this ill-Fated domination by business). Skocpol's empirical
evidence actually-corresponds rathe-r well-to instrumentalist claims.
The fact is, no critique of this perspective--by Marxists or non-
Marxists-vhas adequately refuted the vast empirical evidence for
the pervasive influence of capitalists over the state, especially in
the U.S., provided by Domhoff (1967; 1970; 1979), Useem (1980;
1983), and others working in the tradition of "power structure
r e s e a r cb .v'' There may be other valid criticisms of
instrumentalism--e.g. its lack of explanatory power due to its
neglect of theoretical conceptualization--but its claims have not
been empirically ref'uted.f
The instrumentalist argument has not been refuted by Block
or Skocpol at the level intended. However, they do raise some
important questions that bear directly upon this problematic. It is
certainly a valid contention that different state structures may
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allow a different balance of class forces, and a different degree of
capitalist participation; for example, in the U.S. versus a more
social-democratic system like Sweden (see Weir and Skocpol, 1985).
And the nature and intensity of the resistance by non-capitalist
classes or groups also influences the degree of capitalist power, as
Block and other "class struggle" theorists suggest (see also
Quadagno, 1984). On the other hand, it can be argued that the
"instrumentalist" problematic is only of secondary importance in the
debate on the theory of the capitalist state. As Poulantzas, Block,
and many others have argued, it is not necessary that the "ruling
class" rule directly--even if it is possible, or even historically
existent. There may be structural constraints that induce "state
managers" (whatever their class background) to act in the interests
of capital. It simply may not matter who these managers are.
I would like to suggest an analogy in this context. There are
numerous parallels between Block's theory of "autonomous state
managers" and the theory of managerialism in industrial sociology.
On the one hand, the existence of autonomous managers is an
empirical issue. On the other hand, it doesn't matter, since it can
be argued that capitalist states, like capitalist enterprises, are
subject to the imperatives of capital accumulation and the
structural, class-based conflicts of interest that exist within them/'
This takes, us, then, to the more important critique of neo-Marxist
theories of the state.
State Autonomy and the Structural Problematic
To a great degree, then, the instrumentalist issue is not
crucial. It is still possible to develop a theory of the capitalist state
which posits certain necessary requisites performed by the state,
without them having to be done by capitalists. However, it is
crucial to specify what these "necessary requisites" are, as. well as
the mechanisms through which they are accomplished, if we are to
have a theory of the capitalist state. Thus the question is: are
there any such imperatives, unique to a capitalist mode of
production, about which we can make universal claims?
Here Block and Skocpol diverge dramatically. Once again,
both set up a straw-man--in this case the structuralism of the early
Poulantzas.f But Block's criticism is that Poulantzas is too abstract
and automatic, and does not spell out "the concrete mechanisms
that make a state a capitalist state" (1979:128). He goes on to
specify what he sees as the structural mechanisms that constrain
the capitalist state: dependency on capital accumulation, and class
struggle. Skocpol, on the other hand, rejects the very possibility of
a theory of the capitalist state, opting for the .inductive
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development of "middle-range generalizations" using the "historical-
comparative method" (1985:13).
Are there structural "imperatives" or "constraints" upon
capitalist states? Before responding, the meaning of such concepts,
and the conception of 'theory' itself, must be carefully specified.
To say that a capitalist state "must" do a, b, or c does not (or at least
it should not) imply any teleological assumptions about actual
historical determinacy. This confusion has abounded ever since
critics began attacking Marx's "laws" of the capitalist mode of
production as laws of history. Rather, it means something like the
following. Given a particular definition of 'capitalism,' if
capitalism exists over time, then certain characteristics ("free"
[market allocated] labor-power, private ownership of the means of
production, market allocation of capital, etc.) must be reproduced--
by definition! Further, given certain contradictory tendencies
inherent in a capitalist mode of production (competition, economic
crises, periodic unemployment, in ter- and in tra-class conflicts, etc.),
a capitalist state "must" carry out certain measures--if capitalism is
to be reproduced. Such abstract, analytic statements, based on the
definition of central concepts, is the means by which a theory of
the capitalist state is constructed. It is then applied to real
historical phenomena to sees if it explains anything.
These theoretically posited "imperatives" could be termed
"functional prerequisites." But the difference between this
approach and Anglo-American "structural-functionalism" cannot be
emphasized enough. There is no teleological necessity implied. An
actually existing capitalist state may not do what is "necessary" to
reproduce capitalism, and for all kinds of historically contingent
reasons. Butthen, it would no longer be a capitalist state. A theory
of the capitalist state specifies what the state must do if capitalism
is to·be·· reproduced. It is obvious that the particular a'ctions'
required must vary tremendously depending on the specific socio-
historical context. But those who argue for the possibility of a
theory hold that there are some fundamental "imperatives" and
"constraints" that act upon all state structures in capitalist systems.
No attempt will be made here to argue in support of a
particular list of "structural imperatives." I will simply cite the
most commonly posited candidates. At the center of all neo-
Marxist approaches to the capitalist state is the necessity of
reproducing the conditions for capital accumulation. The state's
first task is to guarantee the reproduction of the capital-labor
relation, which it does through the political-legal system. Further,
given the uneven and contradictory nature of the accumulation
process, periodic crises occur. Given the potential social
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disruptions that may result, extra-economic mediation is required
to reproduce the conditions favorable for accumulation. This is
also provided by the state. But what mechanisms should "motivate"
the state to carry out the required actions? Block suggests one: the
dependency of state managers on capital accumulation itself. Here
he builds on the work of Of'f'e (1974; 1975), as does O'Connor
(1973), who also emphasizes the need for the capitalist state to
promote accumulation. Even Skocpol hints at this. In assessing the
capacity of states to achieve certain goals, she says we must ask
"What authority and organizational means does a state have to
deploy whatever financial resources it does enjoy?" (1985:17). We
must ask this because
A state's means of r a i sm g and deploying financial
resources tell us more than could any other single factor
about its existing (and immediate potential) capacities to
create or strengthen state organizations, to employ
personnel, to coopt po l i tical support, to su bsidize
economic enterprises, and to fund social programs (1985:
1.7).
A neo-Marxist would answer: precisely! And in a capitalist system
(as Block notes), the private control of economic resources and the
possibility of a "capital strike" provide a powerful incentive for
"state managers" to promote accumulation. The actions of the state
may be inadequate, as Skocpol well documents. It is also possible
that the state will exercise its monopoly over the means of violence
to appropriate major control over economic resources.i" But then it
would not be a capitalist sta te. 11
In addition to these "economic" imperatives, theorists of the
.. capita-list -stateusuallyposit-a .number of. ne-cessary political, legal,
and ideological functions. Skocpol is right to stress the historical
diversity of such phenomena. But again, neo-Marxists argue that a
number of minimum prerequisi tes can be specified for any
capitalist system. Examples usually include the preservation of
private property (including the "free" disposition of one's own
labor-power) and individual legal "rights" (such as that of contract)
backed by the coercive power of the state. There are also
structural conflicts of interest inherent in a capitalist system, both
between classes, and between fractions of classes. As in any
political system, these conflicts must be mediated if order is to be
preserved. What is unique is the particular class-character of these
conflicts based on the ownership and control of capital, as "class
conflict" theorists point out.
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It has also been argued that the need to preserve order and
mediate potential social conflicts requires the capitalist state to
maintain a certain degree of legitimacy. This, in turn, requires
provision for the social welfare of citizens that is not provided by
the market. Many theorists have characterized the capitalist state
as having a legitimation/social welfare function, alongside the
promotion of accumulation (see Offe 1974, 1975; Habermas 1975;
O'Connor 1973; Wolfe 1977). Since these measures often act to
offset the vagaries of market-based allocation, they tend to be
redistributive. This suggests a key way in which class-based
conf'licts of interest are transla ted into the political sphere as a
battle over the "social wage."
Whatever the proposed relationship between the
"accumulation" and "legitimation" tasks of the capitalist state, all
neo-Marxist theories stress that accumulation must take precedence.
To turn Skocpol's political sociology "on its side, if not on its
head,',12 the imperatives of accumulation limit the capacities of
capitalist states to promote legitimation and social welfare, to the
extent that the redistributive effects of the latter threaten
accumulation. This is an important (and contemporarily relevant)
example of the economic constraining the political. As we have
recently experienced in the U.S., periods of economic stagnation
seriously affect the ability or willingness of the state to provide
"non-productive" resources to its ci tizens.13
There is certainly merit to the argument that a degree of
autonomy for state managers may result from (or be necessary
because of) a particular balance of class forces (Block). It is also
true that specific, historically determined political structures or
political culture can affect the }vay these struggles manifest
themselves (Skocpol). But capital accumulation is still the primary
imperative' in· a capitalist- sta teo .It can be-promoted .in different
ways, and co-exist with state actions that benefit non-capitalist
interests to varying degrees. But there are boundaries beyond
which even the most liberal capitalist state cannot go. And there
are structural conflicts of interest that reflect a class-based
division of ownership and control of economic resources, no matter
how well these conflicts are mediated by a "welfare state." Upon
these fundamental characteristics a theory of the capitalist state
can be constructed. This possibility is rejected by Skocpol. But by
doing so, as Carnoy points out, "she courts the danger of falling
into an ex post facto empiricism that is atheoretical and explains
nothing" (1984:220, f.n. 5).
Earlier I suggested parallels between Block's argumen ts for
autonomous state managers and the debate on managerialism. I
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will end this section by suggesting another analogy. The emphasis
on the primacy of state structures by Skocpol and other "historical-
comparative" theorists is very similar to earlier developments in
organization theory. Both loca te their theoretical and
methodological roots in Weber. I 4 And both share the same
theoretical problems in explaining the relationship between the
particular organization of interest and capitalism. Just as a theory
which posits the determinative autonomy of a bureaucratic
organizational structure is not adequate in explaining a capitalist
enterprise, a theory which posits the determinate autonomy of state
structures is not adequate for explaining a capitalist state. Both
must "adapt" in particular ways to an "environment" structured by
the imperatives of capital accumulation and class-based conflicts
of interest--ij they are to survive as capitalist organizations. IS
A CONCLUDING COMMENT ON THEORY AND POLICY
In the previous discussion I have examined two arguments for
the autonomy of state structures or state managers in relation to
other societal (especially economic) phenomena. An assessment of
these arguments concluded that there are limits to the concept of
'state autonomy' beyond which the possibility of a theory of the
capitalist state is undermined. This possibility is not seriously
threatened by positing the existence of autonomous state managers
in opposition to instrumentalist claims, as Block does. The
empirical validity of this claim is, however, open to question.
On the other hand, Skocpol's idea of state and party
structures that are independent, or even determinate of, the
"societal" processes of capital accumulation and class struggle does
directly challenge the possibility of a general theory of the
.,- capitalist 'state. This is in fact Skocpol's intention in "bringing 'the" _.
state back in." While the limits of this paper prohibit an adequate
defense of this assertion, I contend that an overemphasis on 'state
autonomy' undermines the explanatory power of political theory
when attempting to understand developed capitalist systems. It
should be emphasized that no judgment is made on the value of
this approach in analyzing pre-capitalist, developing, state socialist,
or other non-capitalist systems. The "primacy of the political" may
well be a valid assumption in these cases, and it is not surprising
that the bulk of the work in this approach focuses on non-capitalist
systems. But to understand the capitalist state, it is necessary to
"bring the economy back in."
What does this long excursus on political theory have to do
with public policy? I contend that the proper theory of the
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capitalist state can aid greatly in understanding recent political
and economic history, and in interpreting recent debates on public
policy. Neither recent U.S. history nor recent policy provide much
evidence for the usefulness of a concept of state autonomy takento
Skocpol's extreme. I will suggest the greater explanatory relevance
of a neo-Marxist approach by considering briefly the current
debates on the American economy.
The relationship between the state and the economy has been
the central issue in recent attempts to explain the stagnation of the
U.S. economy since the early 1970s. It is also the focus of the
competing recommendations for policies to stimulate "economic
revitalization." Conservative "free market". advocates blame state
intervention into the market process for our troubles; a legacy, in
their view, of the liberal "Keynesian" welfare state of the 1960s.
"Corporatist" advocates of a national industrial policy seek a degree
of government coordinated economic planning for re-establishing
our competitive position in the world economy. Social-democratic
critics of capitalism see the recent crisis as a manifestation of
corporate greed, government collusion with capital, and the
contradictory nature of capital accumulation itself. They advocate
a more active role for state, local, and national governments in
promoting social welfare over maximum economic growth; they
also push for a more democratic representation in the political and
economic decision-making process.l"
The striking thing about these otherwise quite different
perspectives is that they all operate with a view of the state that is
constrained by precisely the same structural forces as those
elaborated by neo-Marxist theories. The two fundamental issues
immanent in every position in the "reindustrialization" debate are
(1) the crucial role of the state in promoting accumulation; and (2)
the class-based - conflicts 'of interest that are reflected in the
competing policy recommendations, and in the struggles over
control of the state apparatus itself.
Conservatives and "corporate liberals" both see our recent
problems in "supply-side" terms; that is, as the result of structural
and institutional obstacles to investment and adequate capital
f'orrnation.H They disagree on exactly what these factors were.
But both groups agree that the primary task of the state is to re-
establish the conditions for renewed accumulation. The "state
managers" of the 1960s and 1970s are seen as ha ving failed in
carrying out this primary state function. "Corporatists" and
conservatives also agree in their assessment of recent policy history
as a manifestation of class-based conflicts of interest (they do not
usually use these terms!). For both, one of the major obstacles to
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economic growth has been the "politicization" of the economy that
occurred in the last 20 years. This allowed too many interest
groups access to the state policy-making process. The result was
increasing political pressure for various "entitlements" and other
"unproductive" forms of "social consumption" that siphoned-off an
ever-growing share of our productive resourc~s. Conser:atives and
corporatists differ in their respective solutions to this problem,
however. The former advocate a reduction of the economic role of
the state and a return to more market-based allocation. The latter
do not stress reducing the direct economic role of the state, but
propose that we place decision-making power in the hands of
"responsible" elites.
Social democrats also stress the accumulation function of the
capitalist state, as well as the class-based struggles ~they usually do
use these terms) over economic resources and social welfare ~hat
has been translated into public policy over the past 20 years. SInce
most are at least indirectly influenced by a Marxist conception of
the cap ita lis t s tate , the y r ecog n i ze the. possib I.e con t r a die t i~n
between accumulation and social welfare In a period of economic
stagnation. Many have also noted the. potenti.al confli.ct between
capitalism and democracy, as those with an Interest. In renewed
accumulation work to push back the r eprese n ta t io n of non-
capitalist interests in state policy (see Bov:les and Gint~s, 1982).
Since re-establishing the conditions for maximum economic growth
is not their top priority, most social-democratic analysts. advoc~te
the expansion of democratic participation in economic pOlICY
decisions and expansion of the social welfare provisions of the
state. Just as many conservative and liberal theorists will not
_... a d mi t the degree to w h i c hjp ollcie s promoting renew~d
.. accumulation are detrimental to the interests of other classes, social
democrats are n-ot alwaysclear about the degree to which the state
policies they advocate transcend the limits of the possible for a
capitalist state. Understandably, they hesitate to advocate measures
. f · 1· 18that could be seen to require the destruction 0 caprta Ism.
Neo-Marxist theories of the capitalist state are useful not
only in understanding the structural constraints of the. mod~rn
capi talist state, bu t also in loca ting the de ba tes on econ~mlc.POlICY
both politically and ideologically. Each per sp ect i ve In the
"reindustrialization" debate consciously or unconsciously operates
with a model of the capitalist state that assumes these impera~i~es.
This is necessarily so, since there is little in the recent pol~tlcal
history of the U.S. to suggest the superior r~levance o~ the state
autonomy' model. But this suggests one f'inal question. Pa.st
"revisions" of theories of the sta te ha ve usually reflected changes In
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the socio-historical context in which the author is situated (German
social democracy for the late Engels; the emergence of centralized
European welfare states which lead to the "relative autonomy" of
Poulantzas and Offe; etc.). One wonders, in a period which has
seen the most successful offensive on the state by capital since the
1920s, what historical developments have stimulated the recent
theories of state autonomyj l? In the case of the authors dealt with
in this essay, perhaps the answer is that it is not recent historical
events that they are reacting to, but the recent history of political
theory. Block builds upon elements of neo-Marxlsm that have
emerged in the last 15 years; Skocpol reacts against these trends in
political theory. This is fruitful to some extent, of course. But it is
important not to throw the baby out with the bath, especially in an
epoch when the concepts that have informed recent neo-Marxist
scholarship appear so relevant.
FOOTNOTES
1. Conservative "free market" perspectives range from
traditional conservative views on the need for stable growth,
low inflation, a balanced budget, and minimum government
intervention into the marketplace (Feldstein, 1980; McKenzie,
1983; Schultze, 1983) to monetarists (Friedman and Friedman,
1981), to "supply-side" enthusiasts (Gilder, 1981; Wanniski,
1979). The Reagan administration represents a somewhat
uneasy mix of each of these views (see, for example: Council
of Economic Advisors, 1982; Executive Office of the
President, 1981). Among the most prominent "corporatist"
perspectives, representing varying degrees' of "liberalism," are
Magaziner and Reich (1982);. Rei~h (1982~, 198~b, 1983);
Rohatyn (198'0, 1983); and Thurow (1980, 1984). There is also
a wide range of specific policy recommendations among
"social democrats," but see Alperovitz and Faux (1984);
Bluestone and Harrison (1982); Bowles, Gordon, and
Weisskopf (1983); Carnoy and Shearer (1980); Kuttner (1984);
and Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey (1983).
2. See Skocpol (1979, 1980, 1984, and 1985); Evans, et al. (1985);
Weir and Skocpol (1985); and Skocpol and Amenta (1986). For
a more extensive bibliography of works in this tradition, see
the endnotes to Skocpol (1985).
3. For example, see Jessop, 1977:355.
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4. However, the argument of this paper is also relevant for the
so-called 'post Marxist' theories of the state, such as those of
Cohen (1983), Gorz (1982), and Urry (1981). See Pierson
(1984) for an overview of these perspectives.
5. The proponents of each of these positions, of course, can
point to supporting passages in the texts of Marx and Engels.
See Jessop (1977).
6. For a comprehensive overview of this evidence, see Useem,
1980.
7. Quadagno's (1984) study of another crucial piece of New Deal
legislation--the Social Security Act--is informative in this
context, for she draws on historical evidence very similar to
Skocpol's, but comes up with a different interpretation.
Rejecting Skocpol's model, Quadagno (1984:645) concludes
that
More important than existing bureaucratic
structures were po Ii tical pressures exerted by
locally dominant economic interest groups.
Dominant groups won't support state actions that
aren't in their best interests, and state actions
cannot succeed without this support. Political
structures simply cannot be analyzed as autonomous
entities but must be considered in terms of their
underlying economic dimensions.
8. This analogy is clear in Useem's (1980) discussion, where he
...... 'deals with' both issues-vmanagerialism and the question 'of a
capitalist ruling class.
9. Poulantzas' early work serves as everyone's straw-man
structuralist posi tion, since its level of abstraction,
functionalism, and failure to specify the mechanisms through
which capitalist states are induced to reproduce the
'. conditions of capitalist production make it easy to criticize.
Skocpol is probably justified in calling it "political
functionalism." However, Poulantzas himself acknowledged
the problems in his early works; his later formulations are
more sophisticated. See Carnoy (1984: 108-27).
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10. Block (1980:234) considers this possibility in his discussion of
the "tipping point," the idea that "the state's role in the
eco~omy can reach a tipping point past which capitalists lose
the.Ir capacity to resist further state intervention, leading
ultimately to the Leviathan state." His prime example is Nazi
Germany.
11. I am ignoring the argument that Soviet-style "state socialist"
systems can be construed as "state capitalist" because surplus
is still extracted from workers who do not own or control the
means or pr~ducts of production. Without argument, I will
assert that this stretches the definition of "capitalism" too far
and misses some fundamental (and obvious) difference~
between the two systems..
12. ~ ~esponse to Skocpol's (1985:25) assertion that "Directly or
Indirectly, the structures and activities of states profoundly
condition · · . class capacities. Thus the classical wisdom of
Marxian political sociology must be turned, if not on its head
then certainly on its side." '
13. See Wolfe's (1981) history of the "politics of growth" in the
U.S.--and its limitations, which have become clear in the
economic stagnation since the 1970s.
14. For her appropriation of Weber's methodology, see Skocpol
(1985:7-8). She also acknowledges the influence of Otto"
Hintze (1985:8) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1985:20-21) on her
own "historical-coQlParative" method. Hers is a very selective .'
use of Weber, however. In fact, in an earlier methodological
essay, SkocpolIs somewhat critical of "Weberian'" approaches
to historical sociology, and favors the inductive method of
John Stuart Mill (see Skocpol, 1984)! It is clear that her own
approach is much closer to Mill, though he is not cited in the
later essay.
15. For cri ticisms of mainstream organiza tion theory tha t parallel
those of Skocpol presented here, see the essays in Zey-Ferrell
and Aiken (1981).
16. See note I above for references to each of these approaches.
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